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Chapter 1: Introduction
The United States prioritizes human rights rhetorically but not in practice. As a
result, United States policy is disjointed and conflictual between human rights and
security. The result is an inconsistency in foreign policy. There have been examples of
this throughout United States history. Under the Carter Administration, the United States
took steps to sever its relationships with the dictatorships of Argentina, Uruguay, and
Ethiopia. Yet, Carter maintained ties with other nations such as Iran, the Philippines, and
Saudi Arabia. The late Bush administration promoted democracy around the world but
did little to promote it in key strategic partners such as Egypt, China, and Saudi Arabia.1
The United States pursues such hypocritical policies because security and
economic development are the primary policy priority. Once these objectives are secured
then the United States often pursues or includes human rights as part of its foreign
policies in specific regions and states. However, human rights cannot be placed in the
back burner of foreign policy creation and implementation. It must be included as a
primary objective of United States policy along the other goals such as security.
Following the constructivist argument of international relations, the United States
must perceive its security as pivotal to its existence. Social factors mold the priorities of
the United States.2 Therefore, due to the perceived importance of security, the United
States prioritizes it in the creation and implementation of foreign policy. Constructivism
allows for change to occur in international relations. Thus, in order to change foreign
1

Gelb LH. The rise of ethics in foreign policy: Reaching a values consensus. Foreign Affairs.
2003;82(3):September 23, 2012-2-7. Web site. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033574
22
Katzenstein P. Introduction: Alternative perspectives on national security. In: Katzenstein
P, ed. The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics. West
Sussex, New York: Columbia University Press; 1996:1, 498. ISBN 0-231-10468-5.

1

policy and elevate the importance of human rights, United States perception of its
priorities must change. Human rights must be perceived as just as important as state
security.
The U.S. policy toward El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain represent three
examples of the conflictual policies of United States. The three case studies highlight the
timelessness of the issue. They span the presidencies from the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and
current decade. They serve as examples of cases when the United States prioritized
security over human rights due to the perceived importance of security.
Several determining factors exist that decide a nation’s importance to the United
States and thus the security driven initiatives that take precedence over human rights.
These factors are the independent variables that determine why the United States acts the
way it does currently and in the case studies mentioned above. One factor that
determines policy creation and implementation is the perceived threat level from other
regional hegemons. For example, in El Salvador it was the USSR; in Indonesia, it is
China; in Bahrain it is Iran. A second determining factor is military ties throughout
history, a history of friendly relations that determine current decisions. For example, the
relationship with Indonesia goes far back to the Cold War and Bahrain’s close military
ties since the Gulf War. Thirdly, if another country shares the same enemy or same
threat as the United States there is likely going to be a security tie between them. For
example, in El Salvador the threat was a communist take over; in Indonesia Al Qaeda and
terrorism is a threat; in Bahrain, Iranian influence is a threat. Therefore, the perceived
importance of a country to the United States is the consistent factor in determining when
security initiatives are prioritized over human rights.

2

The first section of the thesis will cover three case studies: El Salvador, Indonesia,
and Bahrain. Each case will 1) provide background information and a summary of
human rights violations in order to provide context for the analysis, 2) list and explain the
reasons why the United States prioritized security, and 3) analyze when human rights are
absent and present in policy. Following a summary of the case studies, the next section
will provide a series of recommendations in order to improve the conflictual policies of
the United States.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
During the Cold War, the constructivist theory of international relations emerged
to account for the changing international setting that differed from traditional methods of
interpreting security. Realism was the predominant school of thought until the
Copenhagen school emerged and dictated that changing norms and perceptions result in
changing definition of security and thus changes in policies and state perception. Ole
Waever, Barry Buzan, and Peter Katzenstein are predominant constructivists who define
security after the Cold War. They call for a widening of the definition of security to
include non-traditional elements such as human rights.
There is no standard definition of human rights. Thus it is important to establish
a definition of human rights that can be element of security policies. The preamble of the
Universal Declaration on human rights states that the “recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.3 It is followed by 30 detailed
articles of human rights outlining the inherent human rights each individual has. The
scholars, Campbell and Jost Stellmacher also further define human rights in their articles.
What are Human Rights?
Before establishing the different arguments of the application of human rights in
an international setting, the definition of human rights must be more thoroughly
examined. Two sources establish different definitions of human rights. Tom Campbell
concerns himself philosophically with the definition of human rights while Jost
Stellmacher classifies different types of human rights.
3

United Nations. The universal declaration of human rights. The United Nations Web site.
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml
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Rights: A Critical Introduction
Tom Campbell explores what constitutes rights and the different types of rights in
his introductory philosophical book. One of the main rights he discusses is human rights.
He describes that everyone possesses human rights regardless of age, sex, race, ethnicity,
religion, or any other method of distinguishing and sorting people. He states that human
rights take precedence over all other rights because of their inherit characteristics as
belonging to all individuals. One of the most fundamental characteristics of human
rights, he describes, is their practicability.4 Human rights can be used in all societies and
all people can abide by them regardless of where they are from in the world
The Cognitive Representation of Human Rights: Knowledge, Importance, and
Commitment
The above article, written by Jost Stellmacher, defines the two different types of
human rights: civil and political rights; and economic, social, cultural rights. The first
category includes the following: the right to life, prohibition of torture and inhumane
treatment, the right to freedom of opinion, and the right to political asylum. The first
category can be described as more fundamental than the second. That is, the fist category
prohibits murder, torture, and ensures personal freedoms. The second category includes
the right to work, protection against unemployment, the right to rest, and the right to a
standard of living, the right to medical care, social security, and education. This category
ensures that people are not just provided the right to life but the right to flourish. For

4

Tom Campbell. The reputation of rights, varieties of rights, three human rights. In: David
Archard, ed. Rights A critical introduction
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example, a person can work and provide for his or her family. Thus, a person is
guaranteed food and shelter, education, and medical care.5
Security and Human Rights
The place of human rights in security is widely debated. Security can be defined
narrowly to military terms and the use of force or widely to include other security sectors.
Realism, liberalism, and constructivism argue for different perspectives of what a
security threat is. Constructivism allows for the most thorough definition for security and
national interests due to its unique ability to allow for change in the perception of what
defines threats.
Rethinking Security After the Cold War
Barry Buzan writes about the changing notion of security after the Cold War.
During the Cold War, security was defined strictly in military terms.6 It was narrowly
focused and concerned itself primarily with war and the use of force. Realism was the
predominant school of thought. However, following the Cold War the narrow focus and
definition of security seemed irrelevant in a new world order. Buzan theorizes that the
state is less important in the new security agenda; it is still central but not a dominant
force in defining security.7 The definition of security must be widened to include
diversified threats such as human rights. Barry Buzan structures his argument on the
Copenhagen School framework. Social norms and cultural phenomena dictate what is a

5

Stellmacher J, Gert S, Elmar B. The cognitive representation of human rights: Knowledge,
importance, and commitment. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology.
2005;11(3):September 27, 2012-267-92. Web site.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327949pac1103_4#preview
6
Buzan B. Rethinking security after the cold war. Cooperation and Conflict. March
1997;32(1):2. Web site http://cac.sagepub.com/content/32/1/5.short
7
Buzan. "Rethinking Security After the Cold War." 13.
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security threat. It allows for changes in the perception of threats whereas realism is
unable to account for such changes.
The Culture of National Security
Edited by Peter Katzenstein, this book contains several chapters written by
different intellectuals about the changing concept of national security and constructivism.
The book claims that a constructivist view of international relations that have driven
changes in social behavior, perception, and changing norms that account for changes in
policy.8” The book seeks to define what constitutes a state’s national interests through
the constructivist paradigm.9 Katzenstein states that “security interests are defined by
actors who respond to cultural factors”.10 He criticizes neoliberals and neorealists as
being unable to account for change or to predict change.11 Instead, following
constructivism, social determinants to security policy include the idea of the collective
identity.12 State identities are a result of their interactions with the domestic and
international environment. Perceptions of the environment a state functions in change
the perceptions of what threats are and therefore changes the undertaken policy. In
conclusion, Katzenstein argues for “broadening the field of security in two directions,
encompassing nonmilitary issues. Concentrate on broader issues of…human
rights…because such issues can have direct effects on the military intervention of
states.”13 The author studies security in its traditional military focus but states that a

8

Katzenstein, Peter, ed. The Culture of National Security: 1.
Katzenstein, 1.
10
Ibid., 13.
11
Ibid., 11.
12
Ibid., 22.
13
Ibid., 524.
9

7

widening of what constitutes a threat is important because of its capability to relate back
to the traditional sense of security.
Security: A New Framework for Analysis
Ole Waever and Barry Buzan collaborated in their book in order to redefine
security. The stated purpose of their book is to establish a new framework for security
studies using constructivism.14 They question the traditional narrow focus of security on
the military and use of force.15 Instead, they argue for a wider view of security issues to
include non-traditional threats. Waever and Buzan contend that defining security in nontraditional views is difficult but that “security is defined as perceived threats to anything
such as the traditional view of a state to non-traditional views of threats” which include
society, the environment, and economic laws. Threats are divided into different sectors.
The military sector of security concerns itself with the armed capabilities of a state. The
political sector concerns itself with the stability of a state. The economic sector concerns
itself with the ability to access resources and the market. The societal sector concerns
itself with the security and sustainability of language, culture, and customs. The
environmental sector concerns itself with the security of resources.16 Waever and Buzan
conclude that there should be a multi-sectorial approach to security. It is important to see
the interconnectedness of different security threats across the different sectors.
Evaluation
The fundamental issue of the existing literature is the extent of what constitutes a
security threat. Is security defined narrowly as only military threats and the use of force?
14

Buzan B, Waever O, de Wilde J. Introduction, security analysis: Conceptual apparatus, the
military sector, the political sector. In: Security: A new framework for analysis. Colorado:
Lynne Reinner Publishers; 1998:1. ISBN 1-55587-603-X
15
Buzan, Waever. Security: A new framework for analysis. 2.
16
Ibid., 7.
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Or is security defined widely to include non-traditional elements of security? The realist
paradigm concerns itself narrowly with traditional security concerns and the balance of
power between states. Constructivists such as Waever, Buzan, and Katzenstein define
security threats more widely to include non-traditional threats such as the threat to human
rights. Each scholar has contributed to the knowledge of international relations theories
through the development of constructivism in the Copenhagen School of thought.
Katzenstein states that non-traditional threats can be intertwined with traditional
security threats. For example, the threat to human rights is a threat to traditional security
because of humanitarian intervention or the use of force to ensure human rights. Buzan
and Waever view security threats as belonging to different sectors. A threat to human
rights is a threat to the societal sector of security.

9

Chapter 3: El Salvador
In El Salvador, the United States not only privileged security over human rights,
but it also strengthened the military that committed human rights abuses. During the
Cold War, security concerns took precedence over human rights due to the perceived
importance of containing communism. The United States pursued its military assistance
in El Salvador despite the military’s abuse of power. As the Cold War ended, human
rights reemerged in United States foreign policy because of changing priorities. The
threat of communism dwindled, and with it the prioritization of securing an El Salvador
without communist rule.
Background Report
El Salvador’s civil war took place between 1980 and 1992. The standing
government of El Salvador and its military were financially backed by the United States
against the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN]. The funding that
the Americans provided resulted in the military’s increased independence from the
civilian government.17 Additionally, it made the government more reliant on the United
States for assistance and the military less accountable towards its people.
Human Rights Violations
Human rights violations by the Salvadoran military were rampant as a result of
the decreased accountability towards its own government and citizens. Throughout the

17

Burgerman S. First do no harm: U.S. foreign policy and respect for human rights in El
Salvador and Guatemala, 1980-96. In: Implementing U.S. human rights policy. LiangFenton, Debra ed. Washington, D.C.: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace;
2004:269. ISBN 1-929223-49-8.
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entire civil war over 75,000 civilians died.18 Between the years 1978 and1983, there
were 42,171 deaths reported.19 Three infamous atrocities highlight the cruelty of the civil
war. The first event took place in 1980 and acted as the catalyst for the civil war.
Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated because he wrote a letter to President Carter.
He pleaded with the United States not to support the Salvadoran military and called for
the military not to harm civilians.20 During the archbishop’s funeral, snipers shot and
killed at least 42 of the mourners.21 The second incident took place in 1980, when four
United States churchwomen were raped and murdered. In the third incident, the 1989
Jesuit Massacre, six Jesuit priests plus a housekeeper and her daughter were murdered.
Each of these three incidents was an important moment within the conflict that altered
foreign policy within the United States.
Perceived Importance of El Salvador
Security is a prioritized policy because of the perceived importance of containing
the spread of communism and curbing the USSR’s influence in El Salvador. As a result,
human rights policy was de-emphasized. El Salvador’s Civil War took place during the
Cold War, and the United States did not want El Salvador to fall under the communists’
sphere of influence. Communism was a threat to American ideology and the idea of

18

El salvador 12 years of civil war. The Center for Justice and Accountability: Bringing Human
Rights Abusers to Justice Web site. http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=199.
Accessed September 23, 2012.
19
Stanley W. Introduction. In: The protection racket state: Elite politics, military extortion, and
civil war in el salvador. Philidalphia: Temple University Press; 1996: 3. ISBN 1-56639391-4.
20
Doyle K, Willard E. Learn from history, 31st anniversary of the assassination of archbishop
oscar romero. The National Security Archive Web site.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB339/index.htm. Updated 2011.
Accessed September 25, 2012.
21
El salvador 12 years of civil war. The Center for Justice and Accountability.
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another state so close to America, influenced by the USSR, was perceived as a direct
threat to American security. United States policy contains traces of human rights
concerns throughout the war, but vary in amount and influence over different time
periods. In the beginning and end of the war, human rights concerns are implemented
into policy in addition to security policy. But, during the middle of the war, security
takes complete precedence despite attempts at implementing human rights.
Human Rights Disregarded
The United States built its security commitment to El Salvador between 1981 and
1989, during the most intense fighting in the country and when a fear of a communist
take over was greatest. The United States feared that other communist countries in the
region, such as Cuba, and the USSR were arming the insurgents.22 As a result, the United
States elevated its security commitment in El Salvador. Several examples demonstrate
the growth of security and weakening of human rights in policy towards El Salvador at
the time the perceived threat of communist El Salvador was largest.
First, in the beginning of the conflict the United States sent 19 military advisors in
order to supervise, train, and aid in countering the leftist guerrillas.23 As United States
commitment grew, the Department of Defense raised the number of military advisors
from 19 to 54 and included experts in combat training.24 Second, in 1983, the United
States made the distinction between military and paramilitary human rights violations,
arguing that paramilitary forces, such as the death squads, were right wing extremists.
The president tried to avert blame from the Salvadoran military and its support for the
22

Grimmett RF. The war powers resolution: After thirty-six years. . 2010:12. Web site.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41199.pdf
23
Grimmett RF. The war powers resolution: After thirty-six years. 19.
24
Ibid., 19.
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death squads,25 in order to protect the military against accusations of human rights
violations due to the geostrategic importance of upholding the current Salvadoran
government against the left wing communists.
Third, in 1984, the Department of Defense appealed to Congress for more money
for military aid.26 The Executive Branch argued that the Salvadoran forces were not
large enough to fight the FMLN. Therefore, the United States had to raise the amount of
military funding in order to be able to fight the insurgents better, despite rampant human
rights violations. In light of this argument, and due to the recent democratic election in
the country, Congress raised the amount of funding for the Salvadoran military.27 In this
example, an improvement in human rights conditions were used to justify the increase in
funding to support the security driven policies. In reality, there was a lack of any real or
substantial human rights improvements on behalf of the Salvadorian military.
During the security driven time of the 1980s, human rights concerns were present
in policy only because they never halted or attempted to curb the U.S. security actions
and policies in El Salvador at the time. Any attempt to disturb the security agenda in the
name of human rights was quickly shut down. The first example of legislation that
passed was H.R. 1271, which;
Amends the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 to
allow the President to make the fourth certification which is required for
continuing aid to El Salvador only if the certification includes a determination by
the President that El Salvador has: made good faith efforts since the last
25

Burgerman, “First do no harm,” 276.
Timeline: U.S. policy in el salvador 1980-2000. PBS Web site.
http://www.pbs.org/itvs/enemiesofwar/timeline2.html. Accessed September 30, 2012.
27
Ibid.
26
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certification to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the murders of
seven U.S. citizens28
The law sought to ensure that the military aid that the president wanted to give to El
Salvador had to comply not only with general human rights violations but also more
specifically with the murder of American citizens.
The second piece of legislation passed by Congress was H.R. 4042 in September
1983. The law sought to continue the requirements established in the 1981 International
Security and Development Cooperation Act. It bought the Congress more time to create
new legislation pertaining to military aid to El Salvador because it stated that the 1981
law would continue until Congress created a new law or until September 30, 1984.29 The
above two initiatives, passed into law because they were not overly aggressive in
restricting the security driven agenda in El Salvador.
Legislation that failed to pass resulted because of the attempt to curb security
assistance to El Salvador. The first piece of failed legislation was H.R. 1899, created in
March 1983. The document never made it past the subcommittees within the Committee
on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives. The bill tried to nullify all military
assistance to El Salvador unless the president consulted with Congress and submitted a
report stating that El Salvador had or had not started negotiations.30 A second bill that

28

Rep. Gerry Studds. H.R. 1271 (98th): A bill with regard to presidential certifications on
conditions in el salvador. Signed by the President. 1983;H.R.1271(98th Congress). Web
site. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr1271
29
Barnes M. A bill to continue in effect the current certification requirements with respect to el
salvador until the congress enacts new legislation providing conditions for united states
military assistance to el salvador or until the end of fisca. Died (At President). 1983;H.R.
4042(98th Congress). Web site. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr4042.
30
Leach J. A bill to provide that, unless the government of el salvador actively participates
in negotiations with all major parties to the conflict which are willing to participate
unconditionally in negotiations for the purpose of achieving a cea. Died(Referred to
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was not passed into law was H.R. 2232, created March 1983. This bill hoped to suspend
all military aid until there were negotiations between the government and FMLN.31 A
third document that was not passed was H.J.RES.86 in February 1983. The resolution
also attempted to prohibit military assistance to El Salvador.32
The difference between the bills that were passed into law and the bills that did
not make it past committees were that the bills that did not pass were too restrictive on
the security driven agenda of the United States. The bills tried to restrict all military aid
to El Salvador, something that the United States would never have permitted due to the
geostratigcal importance of El Salvador. In contrast, the bills that became laws were less
restrictive. The laws required congressional oversight of executive actions and required
reports on El Salvador but did not seek to eliminate military aid.
During a time of strictly security driven concerns, the human rights legislation
that passed into law are important because it marks a period in time when the United
States attempted to have human rights as part of its policy despite having a security
driven agenda.

Committee). 1983;H.R. 1899(98th Congress). Web site.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr1899
31
Feighan E. A bill to suspend military assistance and sales to el salvador until the government
of el salvador has demonstrated its willingness, through the appointment of a peace
commission, to enter into a dialogue with the other parties to the co. Died(Referred to
Committee). 1983;H.R. 2232(98th Congress). Web site.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr2232
32
Kastenmeier R. A joint resolution to prohibit military assistance for el salvador.
Died(Referred to Committee). 1983;H.J.Res. 86(98th Congress). Web site.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hjres86
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Human Rights Reemerge
During the entirety of the Salvadorian Civil War, human rights were most present
at the beginning and end of the conflict. It appeared at the beginning because the United
States had not yet completely committed itself to war and it reemerged at the end of the
conflict as a result of the end of the Cold War.
For human rights to have emerged in policy during the early 1980s it could not
directly interfere with the security policies in El Salvador. The following examples
demonstrate the weak but still present influence of human rights in policy towards El
Salvador.
First, in response to the rape of four U.S. churchwomen in 1980, Congress
initiated H.CON.RES 457. The resolution stated that military assistance to El Salvador
should remain suspended until there was proof that the Salvadoran government was not
associated with the murders.33 It was referred to the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs and met a dead end. The failed resolution marked the attempt at passing
legislation influenced by human rights concerns. Although in this case, human rights
concerns only emerged because those that died were American. Because security
remained a central policy in the early 1980s and the legislation attempted to block
security policy, the human rights agenda was not passed into law.
Second, the Legislative branch made it a requirement of the President to biannually submit a report on El Salvador’s human rights. In order to receive funding for

33

Guarini FJ. A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the congress that all military
assistance to el salvador should remain suspended until the president of the united states
determines that the government of el salvador was not implicat... Died(Referred to
Committee). 1980;H.Con.Res. 457(96th). Web Site.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/96/hconres457
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military assistance, the president would have to certify that El Salvador was attempting to
improve its human rights record as well as control its own military.34 In addition, the
Senate passed S.1196, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1981.35 This piece of Senate legislation
Prohibits the President from consenting to transfers of defense equipment,
articles, or services whose values exceed such trigger price and whose export has
been licensed and approved until a specified time after the certification has been
submitted to Congress.36
Therefore, the President must receive permission from Congress to send any amount over
a designated amount established by Congress. In the late 1970s early 1980s, human
rights concerns were still present in policy because the United States was not strongly
committed to El Salvadorian security until later in the war. Security was beginning to
dominate policy but human rights concerns were still present in the policy at this time.
The late 1980s early 1990s mark the draw down of prioritizing United States
foreign policy on security in El Salvador for two reasons. First, the Cold War was
unraveling and communism became less of a threat to the United States. Second, the
1989 Jesuit murders plus the Moakley report aided in ending the priority of security at the
expense of human rights. A congressional task force created the Moakley Report in
order to investigate the murders of the priests. They found that 9 of the 26 Salvadoran
officers responsible received military training at the U.S. Army School of the Americas.37

34

Burgerman, “First do no harm,” 282.
Percy C. International security and development cooperation act of 1981. Signed by the
President. 1981;S.1196(97th). Web site.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/97/s1196
36
Ibid.
37
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The report exemplifies the lack of real human rights policy in the conflict. The United
States, despite its rhetoric of supporting human rights, instead bolstered the very regime
that committed the atrocities. As a result, the incident was an embarrassment to the
United States, and instigated immediate Congressional action against military spending.
The end of the Cold War began a withdrawal of military security concerns but the
Moakley report sped the end of a security driven agenda.
The Legislative branch acted to halt El Salvador’s military aid in several different
bills. A joint Congress and Senate Resolution signed by the Senate and passed by the
President was the H.J.RES.456, titled “Making further continuing appropriations for the
fiscal year 1992, and for other purposes.” The resolution restricts the amount of aid
available to El Salvador to non-lethal supplies.38 While this particular piece of legislation
passed into law, there were several Congressional failed attempts.
The bill H.R.1346 titled, “Peace, Democracy and Development in El Salvador Act
of 1991”, established three different requirements for El Salvador. First, it hoped to
participate in negotiations between the Salvadoran government and FMLN to create a
cease-fire. Second, it stated its support of the role of the United Nations. Third, it
withheld military assistance, the stationing of US personnel, and financing covert
operations.39 A second bill, created a few months later, was H.R.3497, “El Salvador
Peace, Security, and Justice Act of 1991”. This bill, built on the previous one, sought to
limit the amount of military aid available to El Salvador. It stated that no aid would be

38

Whitten J. Making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1992, and for other
purposes. Signed by the President. 1992;H.J.RES.456(102nd). Web site.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hjres456
39
McDermott J. Peace, democracy and development in el salvador act of 1991. Died(Referred
to Committee). 1991;H.R.1326(102nd). Web site.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hr1326
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provided if 1) the Salvadoran government rejected the UN, 2) El Salvador failed to reach
a cease-fire, 3) El Salvador failed to carry out the UN agreement, and 4) El Salvador did
not prosecute those responsible for human rights crimes. The bill also stated it would
withhold 50% of military aid. 40 Despite not being passed into legislation, 50% of
military aid was withheld. Both bills remained within subcommittees in the H.R.
Committee on Foreign Affairs, but mark the attempts of Congress to limit the strictly
security policy.
Not all of the above initiatives were signed into law, but they were still viewed as
series threats. In 1991, after the FMLN killed two American advisors, President Bush
tried to pass $85 million in aid to El Salvador’s military.41 This attempt at raising the aid
budget occured a few months after the UN started hosting peace agreements. As a result,
Congress withheld half the amount. It withheld half because of past human rights abuses,
but it also gave the President half because of UN negotiations. In this example, human
rights and security concerns resulted in compromise of the policy that was implemented.
Final Analysis
The perception of the importance of security concerns in El Salvador drove
United States policy. The major security concern was the fear of a communist take over
in El Salvador and the domino effect of that result. Interestingly, through the whole civil
war, human rights concerns were never abandoned from the agenda. However, they were
never implemented in such a way as to truly ensure human rights improvements or limit
40

Levine M. El salvador peace, security, and justice act of 1991. Died(Referred to Committee).
1991;H.R. 3497(102nd). Web site.
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security. Instead, at the height of the conflict, human rights improvements were used to
justify a larger security budget.
As security became less of a priority in El Salvador, human rights gained more
foothold in policy directed towards the country. The collapse of the USSR also meant the
collapse of the threat of a communist El Salvador. Therefore, security became less
important. As security became a less important strategy in El Salvador there was less
emphasis on military assistance as a security objective. As a result, human rights
legislation became more prominent in foreign policy directed towards El Salvador.
To ensure consistency in foreign policy, the United States should have evaluated
human rights concerns and security concerns on the same level. If this was done, it may
have been possible to avoid training the forces that committed human rights abuses.
Suggestions to improve human rights conditions in El Salvador, without hindering the
security agenda is to implement human rights classes into the military training that the
Salvadorians receive from the United States.
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Chapter 3: Indonesia
Despite its human rights rhetoric, the United States foreign policy towards
Indonesia demonstrates the prioritization of security. Within Indonesia, there are
instances when both human rights are absent from policy and implemented in security
driven policy.
Background Report
Secessionist movements in Aceh, El Timor, and Papua were the main areas of
conflict and human rights abuses in the past and even currently. In 1999, El Timor was
allowed to vote for their independence after years of conflict and human rights abuses.
In 2005, Aceh and Indonesia reached a peace agreement following the devastation of the
2004 tsunami. However, Papua remains a region rampant with human rights violations.
In 1962, the United States, United Nations, and Indonesia gave Papuans’ the opportunity
for independence under the Act of Free Choice. The choice was not representative of the
population because local authority voted to remain under Indonesian control. In 2003,
Indonesian President, Megawati, decided to divide Papua into three provinces. In 2005,
Indonesian President, Yudhoyono, supported a plan to divide the region further, into five
provinces. Thus, ensuring autonomy would be impossible for Papua.42
The International Crisis Group declared three specific areas that the Indonesian
government must address within Papua.43 Firstly, it must expand its political autonomy
because native Papuans’ are not represented well. For example, the government created
the Papuan’s Peoples Council (MRP) but many people do not interpret it as a real
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representative body because there is no general election.44 Secondly, affirmative action
within the economic sector must be established for native Papuans. Employment for the
natives is difficult due to a preference for Indonesians.45 Lastly, Indonesia must address
the fear of migration within Papua. The native Papuans fear the influx of Indonesians
living within their land and ultimately the destruction of their way of life.46
Human Rights Violations
The State Department notes that Indonesia has made vast improvement within its
human rights record, though most of the improvements are within Indonesia instead of its
controversial territories. For example, the State Departments 2004 Human Rights Report
states:
During the year, the Government made further progress in its transition from 3
decades of repressive and authoritarian rule to a more pluralistic and
representative democracy. The country held successful legislative elections and
free, fair, and peaceful direct presidential elections. Previously, the legislature
chose the president. The Government further reduced the formal political role of
the police and military.47
The Indonesian government became more democratic and the influence of the military
within the Indonesian government subsided. Yet, human rights violations remain
rampant in secessionist areas under Indonesian control. The same State Department
report stated that
Serious problems remained…Security force members murdered, tortured, raped,
beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist movements,
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especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent in Papua. The government restricted the
foreign press from traveling to conflict areas in Aceh, Papua.48
There are several categories used to classify types of human rights abuses. The five main
ones used to describe the situation within Indonesia are unlawful deprivation of life,
disappearances, torture, unlawful detention, and press freedoms.
It is estimated that 100,000 Papuans have died as a result of the military’s control
within Papua.49 In El Timor, the estimated number of murders is 200,000 until the peace
agreement was signed in 1999.50 In addition to murders, there are a large number of
documented disappearances. In 2003, there was 130 kidnappings reported. The
disappearances are mostly within Aceh, whereas Papua has no documented
disappearances.51 All three secessionists regions have a large number of reported
tortures. Within Papua, 256 people were reported tortured in 2003. Human Rights watch
reports that an average of 24 out of 35 prisoners within Aceh are tortured.52 El Timor is
also documented to have used torture in order to extract information and confessions but
no statistical evidence is documented.53 Within El Timor, Aceh, and Papua there are
record of people undergoing detention without warrants or court proceedings. It is
estimated that 60% of arrests within Papua are made without a warrant.54 There is no
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reliable data or statistics on the number of arrests without warrants or unlawful holdings
within El Timor.55
All of the above statistical information regarding the human rights abuses within
El Timor, Aceh, and Papua are not thorough or 100% accurate. This is due to the fact
that journalists and NGOs are not allowed into the regions by the Indonesian government.
Journalists must have permission from the Indonesian government to publish anything,
and they face police intimidation.56
Perceived Importance of Indonesia
Security is a prioritized policy because of long established, friendly relations with
the nation and the perceived importance of combating terrorism after the 9/11 terror
attacks. As a result, human rights policy, while not ignored, is not at the forefront of
United States political action in Indonesia. Several factors contribute to the perceived
security importance of Indonesia.
First, Indonesia is composed of several islands in the East Asian Sea; as a result
the United States is able to monitor several straits near it. The Malacca Strait is a key
waterway connecting the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean along Indonesia’s northern
border.57 The strait is a major shipping channel connecting the South Asian economies.
Thus, maintaining the security and freedom of the waterway is vital to American
economic interests. In addition to the Malacca Strait, the United States cooperates with
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Indonesia to police the Makassar Strait and surrounding waters for terrorist and pirate
activity.58
Second, Indonesia is within China’s sphere of influence, and Indonesia has
expressed concern about its aggressiveness in the region because China is expanding its
naval capacity.59 As a result, Indonesia is a key military ally of the United States in order
to balance China’s military power and influence in the region.60
Third, Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Indonesia
was elevated as a security partner of the United States. Indonesia is composed of the
world’s largest Muslim population. As a result, the United States’ partnership with the
country is two fold. Firstly, it demonstrates to other Muslim nations that the War on
Terror is not a war on Muslims. Secondly, because it is the largest Muslim nation the
United States fears that poverty may be an area for the growth and influence of AlQaeda.61 For example, there have been several terrorists’ attacks on Indonesian soil as a
result of Al-Qaeda doctrine. In 2002, a bomb killed over 200 people at a popular
nightclub in Bali; in 2003, a car bomb killed 14 in front of a hotel in Jakarta; in 2004, a
car bomb outside the Australian embassy killed 9; and in 2005, three suicide bombs in
Bali killed 23.62 Therefore, the United States and Indonesia train together in combating
terrorism.
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Due to the reasons listed above, maintaining a security relationship with Indonesia
and promoting a United States security agenda remain a policy priority. Despite
promoting human rights rhetorically, it falls on the way side of the policy agenda.
Human Rights Disregarded
Due to the perceived importance of maintaining security in Indonesia, the United
States acted to ensure the prioritization of security driven policy. There are several
examples of the United States demonstrating the complete disregard of human rights
standards.
First, the Department of Defense sold military equipment and military parts from
1992-1997 without congressional knowledge or approval.63 In 1993, nearly $4 million
dollars worth of equipment was sold to Indonesia. In the same year, Congress banned
fighter jets, small arms, and riot control equipment from being sold.64 In 1994, $9.3
million dollars worth of equipment was sold to Indonesia, including materials for
manufacturing ammunition, explosives, missiles, and spare aircraft parts.65
Furthermore, in 1995, $7.3 million dollars worth of equipment was sold; in 1996, $9.2
million dollars worth of equipment was sold; in 1997, %5.1 million dollars worth of
equipment was sold; in 1998, $10.6 million dollars worth of equipment was sold.66 As a
result, from 1993 to 1998, a total of $142,480,963 million dollars worth of military
equipment was sold to Indonesia, despite a Congressional ban on military training and
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certain military articles. The above example demonstrates the prioritization of security
policy because the United States sold military equipment to arm the Indonesians against
threats and to maintain friendly relations with the country. The actions were done with
disregard for the consequences to human rights. In fact, the weapons sold to Indonesian
soldiers repressed the individuals in secessionist regions.
Second, while IMET was banned, the Department of Defense trained Indonesian
soldiers under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). IMET was banned
following a massacre in El Timor. From 1992 until 1997, United States and Indonesian
military personnel underwent joint training every few months for a total of 36 times
without notifying Congress.67 JCET trained the Kopassus forces, the Indonesian
Special Forces who notoriously used torture and other extreme methods on civilians in
secessionist regions.68 Even though the exchange-training program was not illegal, many
in Congress viewed it as a way to move around the limitations established on IMET.69
In this example, the United States trained the Indonesian forces that committed human
rights abuses such as torture in secessionist regions. Again, despite verbally committing
itself to international human rights, the United States acts contrarily to its statements.
Third, during the War on Terror, the security driven agenda resulted in several
changes that bolstered the security relationship between Indonesia and the United States.
The United States provided more funding to train and equip the Indonesians in order to
fight terrorism and stop it from spreading during the War on Terrorism. In November
2005, restrictions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) were waved, allowing for over $6
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million in foreign aid to go to the Indonesian Navy for maritime security.70 By May,
restrictions on FMF were lifted even further because the embargo of the sale of non-lethal
weapons was lifted.71 By 2006, Congress passed a budget allowing $990,000 in sales to
Indonesia. In 2007, $6,175,000 was budgeted. And in 2008, $12,872,000 was
budgeted.72 In February 2005, restrictions on IMET were lifted. In addition, Indonesia
received funding for several other security organizations such as the Antiterrorism
Assistance Program and the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.73 Despite the
continuation of human rights abuses in secessionist regions, the United States continued
to support, train, and arm the Indonesian forces.
Human Rights Reemerge
While never entirely absent from policy in Indonesia, human rights never took the
forefront of the agenda either. Human rights concerns became policy in limited cases.
First, an event occurs, such as a massacre, that cannot be overlooked internationally.
Second, as long as the human rights policy does not directly interfere with the security
driven agenda it can become policy. During the War on Terror there are several
successful examples of human rights being written into security driven policies.
First, human rights can result as reactionary policy. In 1991, a massacre occurred
in El Timor that resulted in changed policy. The Indonesian military murdered over 200
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civilians in the Santa Cruz Massacre.74 The Indonesian military used United States
M16s to kill the civilians in the massacre.75 As a result, Congress banned IMET from
1991-1995.
Second, human rights concerns are successfully implemented into a security
driven policy agenda when Congress added additional limitations on IMET. The
program was expanding from IMET to E-IMET under H.R. 3121. Under the law, EIMET included classes on human rights for the nations receiving United States training.76
The law states that IMET was resumed with human rights clauses because of “the
importance of Indonesia as a trade and security partner, on professionalism and human
rights sensitivity of the foreign military beneficiaries”.77 Within this law, Congress
recognizes the security importance of Indonesia in addition to the importance of
international human rights. Therefore, human rights and security were efficiently
compromised under H.R.3121 because IMET was resumed in order to bolster United
States security but with human rights concerns. For example, the law states that
This limited restoration of IMET, therefore, should not be interpreted as an
expression of congressional satisfaction with the Government of Indonesia's
human rights performance in East Timor or elsewhere in Indonesia. The Congress
remains concerned about poor human rights conditions in Indonesia and urges the
Administration to actively promote better human rights practices. Moreover, the
Congress looks for improvements in these areas prior to restoration of the full
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range of security cooperation with Indonesia, as it existed prior to the massacre in
Deli, East Timor, in November 1991.78
Congress states that it is not fully satisfied with human rights conditions in Indonesia but
understands the importance of maintaining a security partnership with the country
through arms sale and joint training. Therefore, Congress improved the Department of
Defense’s training program to include human rights classes. In this example, human
rights policy is successfully implemented along with security policy in Indonesia.
Human rights and security policies can coexist, but human rights policies are not
implemented if they disrupt security rather than work with it. There are several bills that
met their end within committees of the House of Representatives as a result of this.
Two bills that died within Congress that tried to limit the powers of the executive
due to human rights violations are H.R.1063 and H.R. 3918. H.R. 1063, International
Military Training Transparency and Accountability Act, was initiated by the 106th
congress in 1999. The bill attempted to “prohibit the sale of weapons and training to any
foreign country that is not allowed to receive international training or arms sale”.79 The
second bill that failed to pass into law was H.R. 3918, Indonesia Human Rights Before
Military Assistance Act. The bill sought to restrict the sale of lethal military equipment,
helicopters, building materials, ammunition, and parts to Indonesia unless the president
certified that the Indonesian government was improving its human rights record. 80

78

Ibid.
Smith C. International military training transparency and accountability act. Died(Referred to
Committee). 1999;H.R. 1063(106th). Web site.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/hr1063
80
McKinney C. Indonesia human rights before military assistance act. Died(Referred to
Committee). 1998;H.R. 3918(105th). Web site.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/105/hr3918
79

30

In order for human rights to successfully become part of a security driven agenda,
it must not limit arms sales and training programs. For example, in 2006, H.R. 3057:
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, was signed into law. The
law required that no less than $1,000,000 be available for Indonesia to enhance security.
The law specifically includes that the countries that receive aid must be “consistent with
the democratic principles and rule of law”.81 Even though security remains a primary
objective in the bill, it also ensures clauses respecting human rights values are stated.
Even though the law does not primarily concern itself with human rights, undertones of
the objective are written into the security-concerned law. For example, the law states that
the President can “issue licenses for the export of lethal equipment only if the secretary of
state confirms that the Indonesian government is prosecuting soldiers for human rights
violations”.82 In addition, the law states that the Secretary of State must report to
Congress on the status of Indonesian prosecutions for human rights abuses.83 In this
example, Congress implements human rights policy in a more subtle way, such as
requiring reports on the country and linking the sale of lethal military supplies to military
tribunals.
Final Analysis
The perception of the importance of security concerns in Indonesia drive United
States policy. The major security concern was maintaining a U.S. presence in a strategic
region and containing terrorism particularly during the War on Terror. There are
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instances in policy where human rights are completely absent and when human rights are
present. But, whether human rights are absent or present from policy, security remains
the priority of the United States in Indonesia.
To ensure consistency in foreign policy, the United States should have evaluated
human rights concerns and security concerns on the same level. If this was done, it may
have been possible to avoid training and arming the security forces committing human
rights abuses in Indonesia. A suggestion to improve human rights conditions in
Indonesia, without hindering the security agenda, is to have restricted military sales of
non-lethal materials. In this example, equipment is still sold to Indonesia, but not
harmful material that could have been used to repress people in secessionist regions. An
example of human rights and security concerns implemented into coherent policy was the
transition from IMET to E-IMET.
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Chapter 4: Bahrain
In light of the Arab Spring and United States’ promises towards its commitment
to human rights, U.S. relations with Bahrain demonstrates the prioritization of security
concerns over human rights. In particular, during the War on Terror, security concerns
take precedence over human rights due to the perceived importance of security in war.
The United States pursued its military relations and sales with Bahrain despite the
country’s disregard for its citizens’ human rights. As war ended, human rights crept back
into United States foreign policy because of changing priorities. Security remains the
central factor of policy creation in Bahrain, but human rights concerns are also present.
Background Report
The small Sunni population controls most of the economic wealth and political
representation in the majority Shi’a nation of Bahrain. As a result, the Shi’a majority is
underrepresented in the government and does not receive the same economic
opportunities as the Sunni population. The problems of Bahrain lingered under the
surface of the country for years until the Arab Spring catalyzed the situation and brought
the strife into the forefront of Bahraini politics. The Shi’a demands during the Arab
Spring were threefold: alter the constitution to give more power to the parliament, end
gerrymandering, and provide more equal economic opportunities.84
The Arab Revolt reached Bahrain February 17, 2011. Sleeping demonstrators
were awoken by tear gas and rubber bullets. Four people were killed on the first day of
the protests at the Pearl Roundabout. On February 18, directly following the police
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actions, the protests grew larger. On February 19, security forces pulled away from
confronting protestors in response to United States’ urging. On February 22, the crown
prince tried to initiate a formal dialogue to resolve the protestors’ demands. After
protestors reached the financial district of the country on March 13, Bahrain appealed to
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In response, Saudi Arabia sent 1,200 forces and 20
tanks. The United Arab Emirates sent 600 police. The influx of foreign troops
represented an overwhelming show of force against civilian populations. By June 29, the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) created a set of recommendations to
help resolve the conflict and restore peace in the country. The Shi’a majority rejected the
initiative because parliament did not have full authority but was praised by the United
States as a step in the right direction. By November 26, King Hamad established a
government commission to enact BICI’s recommendations, which failed to stop the
protests.85
Human Rights Violations
The government’s mishandling of the protests received international attention and
brought the issues of human rights to the forefront of the conflict. Over the course of the
protests, 52 were confirmed dead. Five died from torture techniques such as beating,
cables, whips, electrocution, sleep-deprivation, and temperature exposure. Over 1,800
people were detained without warrants, held without hearings, and denied trials. In
addition, police threatened detainees and their families with rape and murder. Bahraini
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security forces detained kids under fifteen and destroyed 30 Shi’a mosques.86
Additionally, the media and NGOs’ access to the nation during the Arab Spring were
severely limited. In summary, Bahrain’s list of human rights abuses include unlawful
deprivation of life, torture, unlawful detention, and media repression.
Importance of Bahrain to the United States
Security is a prioritized policy because of the perceived importance of the
relationship between Bahrain and the United States. Bahrain is a key geostrategic ally of
the United States for three major reasons. First, it is located in the middle of the Arabian
Gulf across from Iran. The United States ensures that shipping remains open for vital
economic trade in oil and other resources.87 Bahrain’s key location leads to the second
reason it is an important ally to the United States. The small country hosts the American
Navy’s 5th fleet, which is composed of 30 warships and over 30,000 sailors.88 Bahrain is
a major logistical center, rest stop, and resupply zone of the United States military
operating in the Gulf region and the Middle East. The United States also conducts joint
training with the Bahraini military. Bahraini defense forces send their personnel to the
United States for training in addition to purchasing American weapons. In the past
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decade, military sales have reached nearly $1.5 billion.89 Third, after 9/11, Bahrain
became a major non-NATO ally in the War on Terror for its military partnership as well
as its logistical capacity. The relationship has been in place since the first Gulf War with
Iraq in 1991. The United States and Bahrain’s combined task force interdicts weapons of
mass destruction, terrorists, and narcotics in the Arabian Sea.90 In addition, Bahrain runs
support missions for the United States forces acting in Afghanistan. As a result of this
military relationship and Bahrain’s status as a key ally of the United States, security
concerns dominate foreign policy
Human Rights Disregarded
Due to the perceived security importance of Bahrain to the United States, the
U.S. has acted in ways to ensure the continuation of a security driven agenda. This is
especially true during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Three examples of the
prioritization of security are examined below.
First, Bahrain received additional money for various security programs in Bahrain
after the terrorist attacks on the United States. For example, between 2002-2004 the
United States provided $143.1 million for the Foreign Military Fund and $1.442 trillion
for IMET.91 The United States offers a lot of security assistance to the tiny island nation,
but the United States receives several security benefits from the relationship. For
example Bahrain “provided extensive basing and over flight clearances for a multitude of
U.S. aircraft operating in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation

89

Bowman, "Bahrain: Key U.S. Military Hub."
Kenneth, “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy,” 25.
91
Katzman K. Bahrain: Key issues for U.S. policy. March 24, 2005:4. Web site.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/46433.pdf
90

36

Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Bahrain also deployed forces in support of the Coalition”.92 Bahrain
hosted 4,000 troops for OEF and 4,500 troops for OIF.93
Second, the Defense Cooperation Pact was created during the first Gulf War and
allows for the 5th fleets presence in the country. It is re-signed every 10 years. The pact
was re-signed in 2001 but five years additional years were added to the program. As a
result its new signing date is October 2016 instead of 2011.94 American security and the
retention of a key ally within the Gulf drove the president to add the additional years to
the defense pact.
Third, there is no legislation criticizing Bahrain or condemning human rights
abuses and lack of equality among the Sunni and Shi’a. For example, in 2003 Congress
wrote H.CON.RES.211. The resolution expresses gratitude for Bahrain and other gulf
countries for their support in Operation Iraqi Freedom.95 Another example of Congress
expressing thanks and friendliness to Bahrain is in H.CON.RES 31: Welcoming His
Majesty Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al-Kalifa, King of the Kingdom of Bahrain, on his visit to
the United States in February 2003. Like the other resolution, this document also
commends Bahrain for its support in the wars and its support for the relationship between
Bahrain and the United States.96 Both these resolutions thank Bahrain for the security
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relationship the two countries have at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It
was not until later that Congress took a different tone after much of the fighting in Iraq
had passed and the war became unpopular.
Human Rights Reemerge
Human rights began to etch its way into policy at the draw down of the Iraq War
as a result of the changing priorities of the United States policies in Bahrain. Strictly
military security concerns were deemphasized at the draw down of war and human rights
concerns reemerged.
The War on Terror was the reason for the narrowly focused security driven policy
in the early 2000s but in the late 2000s security remained a priority because the United
States feared the fall of Sheikh Hamad. The U.S. feared the rise of a Shi’a government
that would be more perceptible to Iran’s influences and less friendly to the United States.
It poses a threat to the United States influence in the region and possibility of severing the
Defense Cooperation Pact with Bahrain.97 As a result, security remains central to United
States policy in Bahrain but human rights have reemerged in policy as well.
In 2008, a bill was introduced in the Senate that sought to re-introduce the issue of
human rights into the strictly security driven policy towards Bahrain. The resolution
S.RES.619 is titled “Resolution expressing support for a constructive dialogue on human
rights issues between the United States and Bahrain”.98 The Senate calls on the President
as well as the Secretary of State to jumpstart the dialogue between Bahrain and the
United States about human rights issues in the country. The resolution died within the
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Committee on Foreign Relations and was never passed into law or signed by the
President. It was not until the Arab Spring and increased international media attention
that Congress acted more aggressively in limiting the security driven policy towards
Bahrain.
When the Arab Spring started in Bahrain, the Department of Defense tried to
pass an arms sales bill through Congress. On September 14, 2011, the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible military sale to Bahrain. 99 The
United States wanted to sell 44 armored vehicles and hundreds of TOW missiles. The
sale was worth $53 million dollars and announced only seven months after the initial start
of the conflict.100 The arms sale was to be used only to defend against outside threats
and thus it did not breech the Leahy Amendment, which states that the United States
cannot sell military equipment that is used against the receiving nation’s own citizens.
Thus, the loophole in the amendment made the arms sale possible. In this example, the
Leahy Amendment ensures that security is not met at the cost of human rights in foreign
policy. It represents an important piece of legislation that tries to balance security and
human rights in foreign policy.
In response to the proposed arm sale, Congress tried to initiate H.J.RES.80, which
states that the proposed arms sale to Bahrain is prohibited due to human rights abuses
unless the Secretary of State certifies five things: 1) Bahrain is conducting investigations
and prosecutions of those responsible for torture and mishandling of protestors,
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2) Bahrain is no longer torturing its citizens, 3) Bahrain is rebuilding destroyed mosques,
4) Bahrain lifts government employment restrictions based on religion, and 5) Bahrain
implements BICI.101 The bill was introduced in 2011 and has not been passed by the
House of Representatives, Senate, or President. Another resolution, not signed into law,
is S.J.RES.28, which reaffirms the forementioned legislation to limit the sale of certain
defense items to Bahrain.102
The legislation may not have passed, but a Congressional letter sent to Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton by the Senate received feedback. The letter, written on October
12, 2011, stated that the proposed military sale would weaken American credibility. The
letter stated that:
Completing an arms sale to Bahrain under the current circumstances would
weaken U.S. credibility at a critical time of democratic transition in the Middle
East. We urge you to send a strong signal that the United States does not condone
the repression of peaceful demonstrators by delaying the possible arms sale until
the Bahraini government releases its political prisoners, addresses the independent
commission’s recommendations, and enters into meaningful dialogue with
Bahraini civil society and opposition groups.103
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While the letter may not have been the cause of halting the arms sale, it serves as an
example of human rights concerns shaping policy implementation.104
The Legislative Branch only found temporary success in halting the Executive
Office’s initial military arms sale. The initial $53 million plan was unsuccessful, but a
loophole in the law allowed for the President to send military sales under $1 million
without notifying Congress. Additionally, the administration can divide each individual
sale to ensure it is below the $1 million dollar mark to ensure Congress cannot block the
deal.105 In this example, human rights and security are important policies of the United
States instead of one over the other. As a result, human rights concerns became policy
through the Congressional blocking of the initial military arms deal. However, because
military security remains an important priority of the United States, the arms deal is
restructured and implemented differently. The two policies may appear to butt heads but
the importance of the example is that human rights concerns and security concerns are
both implemented in United States foreign policy.
The BICI report was officially released in March 2012, one month later, the
United States re-initiated its initial arms sale with modifications. In this example, human
rights and security concerns are both elements of the United States policy toward
Bahrain. The BICI report is an important indicator of human rights accountability and
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progress. As a result, security driven arms sales are implemented. Lethal materials such
as TOW missiles, Humvees, tear gas, and other similar items that could be used against
protestors would not be sold. But materials for harbor security vessels and F-16s were
among the items sold to Bahrain. The State Department released a statement that they
have “made this decision mindful of the fact that there remain a number of serious,
unresolved human rights issues in Bahrain, which we expect the government of Bahrain
to address.”106 In response to the arms sale, Congress initiated its own statement that it
was pleased that lethal materials were being withheld but worried that the arms sale
would send a wrong message to Bahrain.107 The implementation of both security and
human rights policies may not have resulted in perfectly streamlined policy but at least
the policy was implemented with regards to human rights. As a result, United States
policy is less inconsistent with its National Security Strategy and own established values.
Final Analysis
The perception of the importance of security concerns in Bahrain drove United
States policy. During a time of war, security was perceived as more important than
human rights. The major security concern in Bahrain was bolstering a nation friendly to
the United States in the Gulf region, especially when the major threat in the region for the
U.S. is Iran. Human rights reemerged in policy after the Iraq war, but was never at the
forefront of the policy agenda. In fact, human rights policy was often implemented only
106
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if loopholes were in the policy that allowed for the prioritization of security. For example,
the large arm sale was halted due to human rights abuses, but still allowed for small
military sales to continue. Human rights and security remain conflictual policies in
Bahrain.
Therefore, to ensure consistency in foreign policy, the United States should have
evaluated human rights concerns and security concerns on the same level. If this was
done, it may have been possible to avoid a policy tug of war between security and human
rights. The example of limiting arms sales due to human rights, is the closest that human
rights comes to being on equal footing with security concerns.
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Chapter 5: Summary of Content
The United States prioritizes human rights rhetorically but not consistently in its
actions in the case studies of El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain. The reason for this is
because security is prioritized over human rights. Once security is ensured, then human
rights are included in policy. Although there are few cases when human rights and
security objectives are both written into coherent policy, it is inconsistent. The United
States must consistently ensure human rights and security rhetoric are practiced in policy
rather than security over human rights.
Following the constructivist theory of international relations, the United States
prioritizes security over human rights in policy because it perceives security as pivotal to
its existence. Social factors mold the priorities of the United States, and when those
factors change so do the priorities.
In El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain, the United States prioritized security over
human rights due to the social factors that drove the securitization of policy.
Nonetheless, each case contains elements of when human rights and security are both
written into policy. The inclusion of human rights in security policy remains inconsistent
in each case study but represents a starting point to create more consistent policy.
In El Salvador, the United States privileged security over human rights and even
bolstered the Salvadorian military that committed human rights abuses. The reason for
this is because the United States prioritized security due to its perception of the
importance of combating communism in Latin America. A social factor that contributed
to the perception of prioritizing security was the Cold War against Russia and the spread
of communism.
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Within El Salvador, human rights were either absent from policy or emerged
towards the end of the conflict. During the height of the Civil War during the 1980s, the
United States consistently prioritized security over human rights. The United States
defended the Salvadorian military against accusations of human rights abuse and
continued to train and arm them. Additionally, the Department of Defense used human
rights as an argument for increasing security spending in El Salvador. A democratic
election in El Salvador was justified as an improvement in human rights and therefore
military spending increased despite a lack of real human rights improvement on behalf of
the Salvadorian military. Human rights reemerged in foreign policy towards the end of
the conflict because of changing social factors. The Cold War was near an end and the
threat from USSR subsided. Therefore, the security driven agenda also changed and
human rights were considered in policy decisions. For example, in 1992, a law passed
stating that any military aid sent to El Salvador was restricted to non-lethal supplies.
Therefore, in El Salvador security was prioritized during the height of the Civil War. As
the Cold War ended, so did the securitization of policy in El Salvador and human rights
concerns were written in policy.
In Indonesia, the United States prioritized security over human rights and again
bolstered the Indonesian military that committed human rights abuses. The reason for
this is because the United States prioritized security due to its perception of the
importance of maintaining influence and a presence in South Asia. A social factor that
contributes to the perception of prioritizing security is maintaining a relationship with
Indonesia in order to balance the regional hegemon, China. After the attack on the
United States’ World Trade Center, another social factor that contributed to the
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prioritization of security policy was the War on Terrorism. Indonesia became a partner in
combating and preventing the spread of terrorism.
United States policy is contradictory in Indonesia because there are cases in
which human rights concerns are overlooked and there are cases in which human rights
are successfully integrated within security policy. Human rights were not considered in
policy when the Department of Defense sold military equipment totaling $142 million
that was used against civilians in the secessionist region. The military sales occurred
after the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991, when United States M16s were used against
people in El Timor. Another example occured under JCET, in which the United States
trained the Indonesian Special Forces who were known for committing human rights
atrocities. However, there are examples of the successful implementation of human
rights policy within the context security policy. The most successful model is the
transition from IMET to E-IMET. In this example, education about human rights were
added to the military training program for Indonesian soldiers. Therefore, in Indonesia
security was and is prioritized but there are limited cases when human rights concerns are
written into security driven policy.
In Bahrain, the United States prioritized security over human rights but did not
bolster the Bahraini military during the Arab Spring. The reason the United States
prioritized security in Bahrain is due to the perception of the importance of maintaining
influence and a presence in the region. Social factors that contribute to the prioritization
of security are balancing Iran’s influence in the region, ensuring the waterways remain
open for economic reasons, and ensuring the continuation of U.S. military privileges in
the country.
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Within Bahrain, human rights were absent from policy at the height of the war in
Iraq but reemerged during the Arab Spring. During wartime, the United States provided
$143 million for FMF and $1 trillion for IMET training despite that during this time there
was never fair or equal representation of all peoples within the government of Bahrain.
Instead, in 2003, the United States commended the security relationship with Bahrain and
thanked the country for its support in U.S. wars. Towards the end of the war the strictly
security driven policies diminished and human rights reemerged. For example, at the
start of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Department of Defense tried to pass a large military
sales initiative to Bahrain. However, due to human rights concerns, the initiative did not
pass. In response, the Department of Defense kept military sales under $1 million dollars
each until human rights conditions improved. Once conditions improved the arms sale
occurred with the exception that lethal materials were not sold. In this example, human
rights appears to have conflicted with security policy. Despite this, human rights concerns
resulted in altered security policy. Security remains the prioritized policy in Bahrain, but
elements of human rights policy emerge in Bahrain.
In summary, all three cases contain conflictual policy that include human rights
rhetoric and security-implemented policy. However, in all three cases, human rights
policy emerge under different conditions. United States perception of the prioritization
of security must change to further include human rights. Human rights must be written
into security driven policy to ensure that human rights rhetoric matches United States
foreign policy and actions abroad. The following chapter provides a series of
recommendations to embed human rights concerns into security policy.
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Chapter 6: Concluding Recommendations
Security remains a central policy of the United States. But the notion of
sacrificing human rights objectives for security is false. Both foreign policy goals can
co-exist together and even bolster each other when approached and utilized correctly.
Therefore, this final chapter seeks to create a set of recommendations to improve the
future of American foreign policy in hopes of preventing such conflictual policies of the
past.
Key Findings
The following findings from the case studies highlighted in the previous chapter
form the basis for the policy recommendation.
1) Ever since human rights have risen in importance to the United States, America has
engaged in controversial actions in the name of security at the cost of human rights. In
El Salvador, the fear of a communist takeover in the region influenced the United States
to support a corrupt government and its military at the cost of thousands of civilian
lives. In Indonesia, U.S. military partnership with the country has benefited the United
States greatly, but many people in secessionist regions have struggled under the
Indonesian military. The U.S.-Bahraini military partnership again benefits both
countries but the Shi’a population suffered from an unfair governmental system even
before the Arab Spring. Therefore, American foreign policy goals must be rectified to
ensure human rights do not suffer while promoting security goals.
2) There are cases in El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain in which human rights policy is
successfully implemented in a security driven agenda. In El Salvador, human rights
were written into policy at the end of the conflict when security was no longer a priority
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due to the end of the Cold War. Military funding was suspended near the end of the
conflict in light of the Moakley report. In Bahrain, human rights were written into
policy again at the end of conflict. In this case, the end of the Iraq war marked the
reemergence of human rights into policy. The Leahy Amendment ensured that security
through an arms sale was not achieved at the expense of human rights during the Arab
Spring. In Indonesia, human rights were written into security driven policy
inconsistently. However, when written into policy, human rights did not disrupt the
security agenda. Instead, it worked with it perfectly to ensure human rights and
security concerns were met. These examples from the case studies are what the United
States must build off to create more consistent foreign policy.
Alternative Policies Considered and Rejected
The following are options of the United States that should not become policy for
various reasons highlighted below.
1) Maintain the Status Quo: As highlighted throughout American history, prioritizing
security has heavy costs to the objective of human rights. Therefore, maintaining the
status quo is not the answer. Instead, the United States should seek a balanced approach
that emphasizes that both security and respect for human rights are equally important in
the international setting,
2) Disregarding Human Rights: Removing the promotion of human rights as an
international political agenda would weaken United States authority abroad. The United
States values human rights domestically. The United States must project those value
abroad and act according to its values.
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A Balanced Approach
A better approach focuses on creating a balance between promoting security and
human rights as foreign policy goals. States that are American partners enjoy many
benefits of friendships such as security-based alliances. However, within such a
relationship an element of human rights respect must also be promoted.

A key

component of the strategy is to ensure that elements of human rights concerns are written
into security driven policies. Therefore, human rights concerns do not necessarily
obstruct security driven policy but instead works cohesively within it. Therefore, United
States policies can be less conflictual and inconsistent.
Advantaged
The following are the advantages of the proposed strategy.
1) The policy demonstrates American leadership, values, and ideology abroad. The United
States is a superpower internationally. Because it is a nation that strongly believes in its
own value system, including universal human rights, it has the potential to be the leader
in promoting these universal values. But it can only do so by not being hypocritical by
supporting human rights sometimes and security other times.
2) The policy does not contradict the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. The
United States is a key leader within the United Nations. Therefore, complying with the
standards established within the UN document does not tarnish the perception of our
leadership internationally. Focusing on security, at the expense of human rights, often
promotes corrupt leadership and action that is condoned in the document. Therefore,
ensuring that respect for human rights is met within security driven agendas does not
contradict the international standard of human rights.
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Key Policy Recommendation
Embedding elements of human rights concerns within security establishments will
involve interagency cooperation. Based on the recommendations above, the following
are key policy recommendations.
1) Department of Defense: As one of the largest Executive Departments, the DoD is
responsible for all components of the military and international military programs.
IMET is an example of a security driven training tool for partner nations that is funded
by the State Department. When the program became E-IMET, human rights training
initiatives were included. More programs that include human rights elements in foreign
training must be included in DoD programs to ensure the governments the United
States is supporting receive training in complying with and understanding the universal
human rights norms.
2) The National Security Council: The key members of the National Security Council are
the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and
the Secretary of Defense.108 Therefore, it is important to include an element in this
council that focuses its resources on human rights, specifically the effects of human
rights in states supported by the United States or that receive military funding.
3) State Department: The mission statement of the Department of States is to “create a
more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people
and the international community.”109 Therefore, the department must cooperate more

108

White House. National security council. The White House Web site.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc. Accessed November 13, 2012.
109
State Department. Mission statement. U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action Web
site. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm. Updated 2009. Accessed
November 13, 2012.

51

with the Department of Defense in implementing and creating security driven policies
with respect for human rights. E-IMET, is the perfect example but must be
implemented on an even larger scale under different programs.
•

USAID: The cooperation between USAID and DoD can create a strong foundation
for security partnerships that respect and promote human rights. USAID is
currently promoting good governance as a tool to bolster human rights through anticorruption, reform, legislative strengthening, decentralization, public management,
and security sector reform.110

Concluding Thoughts
The recommended policy is based on a firm belief in the importance of promoting
human rights. Developing policy with human rights elements will be difficult due to the
securitization of United States foreign policy. Therefore, the United States must change
its perception of the foreign policy priorities in order to embed human rights concerns
into security policy. Hopefully, such changes will ensure that the United States does not
bolster human rights abusers or ignore human rights in its partner nations such as the
cases of El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain.
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